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The many small sovereign states and multiple shades of sovereignty that exist across 
the  present-day  Pacific  Island  region  are  largely  the  product  of  the  region‘s  colonial 
history. Yet,  the story of regionalism  among the Pacific Islands began in pre-colonial 
times. This  history,  in turn,  has  been  shaped by  the  region‘s geography  and  natural 
resource endowments. The region was colonized after other parts of the world because 
of  its  physical  isolation  and  the  difficulties  of  access  from  Western  Europe.  Post-
colonization, the region was partitioned through contests for space among powers from 
inside and outside the region, and in response to competition among Protestant and 
Catholic  churches  seeking  to  expand  their  respective  congregations.  The  security 
concerns and strategic interests of the major powers have shaped regionalism and are 
likely to remain important factors for the foreseeable future. Trade integration, however, 
is not a significant factor contributing to regionalism today. Thus, Pacific Island countries 
may want to pursue trade liberalization unilaterally. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
The story of regionalism in the Pacific Islands has been, and continues to be, shaped by 
geography  and  natural  resource  endowments.  These  endowments,  in  turn,  have 
provided the economic incentives for trade and integration.  Prior to  colonization, this 
―sea  of  islands‖  was  deeply  integrated  and  the  inhabitants  of these  islands regularly 
criss-crossed the ―boundless and borderless‖ ocean in order to trade, wage war, and 
settle new lands (Hau‘ofa, 1993). Colonization by western powers introduced borders: 
some artificial, and most via imaginary lines drawn on water. These partitions, however, 
confined  islanders  to  their  terrestrial  boundaries,  created  dependent  territories  of 
competing  colonial  powers,  and  consequently  impeded  trade  and  commerce  among 
them. Decolonization over the half-century to 2009 has left the region with 16 sovereign 
island nations and a further 10 dependent territories, entrenching domestic (as opposed 
to regional) political and economic interests. Recently, however, a push has been made 
to  rekindle  the  kind  of  integration  and  cooperation  experienced  before  colonialism.  
Regionalism,  as  it  is  known,  attempts  to  create  more  fluid  borders  with  a  view  to 
establishing closer political and economic ties. It is akin to charting a course back to the 
future;  a  future  comprising  the  sea  of  islands  that  existed  prior  to  colonization. And 
importantly for the discussion in this paper, regionalism prior to colonization prevailed 
without supporting institutions,  or at least not in the form  that  exist today. Could the 
region return to its original notion of a sea of islands?  Could regionalism chart a course 
back to the future?   
 
The central thesis of this paper is that geography and economics, the latter underscored 
by natural endowments, determined the history of colonization within the Pacific Island 
region.
1 This history in turn gave rise to nation states following their independence. The 
above explains both the creation of the Pacific Islands and the evolution of regionalism 
therein. The South Pacific Commission, the predecessor to the Secretariat of the Pacific 
Community (SPC), was created out of the colonial past, while the Pacific Island Forum 
(PIF) is a product of decolonization. Both of these organizations presently co-exist. They 
continue  to  shape,  and  are  themselves  being  shaped  by,  regionalism.  The  past 
continues  to  impact  on  the  future  with  many  of  the  challenges,  such  as  those  of 
economic development and security, continuing to drive regionalism. These same forces 
are  likely  to  continue  to  shape  regionalism  in  the  21
st  century  as  well.  Modernity, 
however,  has  introduced  issues  of  climate  change  and  management  of  oceanic  and 
atmospheric resources sustainably.     
 
This study has the potential to inform the motivations for and challenges of regionalism 
beyond the Pacific. This is due to three reasons: (i) a large number of (small) countries 
and territories are involved, (ii) the relatively recent colonization offers sufficient data for 
analysis, and (iii) there is considerable diversity across the region relating to several 
attributes  that  are  important  for  the  formation  and  fragmentation  of  clubs  of  nations.  
These  features  make  the  Pacific  Islands  a  convenient  laboratory  for  the  study  of 
                                                            
1  Politics  and  security  concerns  have  also  mattered,  but  these  in  turn  have  been  shaped  by  the 
geography and history (of colonization) of the region.  
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regionalism. In addition, the effects of climate change on the Pacific Ocean and island 
residents make regionalism of relevance to the international community.    
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides the context for this 
analysis.  Section 3 summarizes the historical forces that led to the creation of nation 
states, and self-governing and dependent territories.  Section 4 provides the reasons for 
regionalism  within  the  island  Pacific.    Included  in  this  section  is  an  inventory  of 
organizations  (hard  institutions)  and  agreements  (soft  institutions)  for  regionalism.  
Section 5 presents a summary of the governance and funding mechanisms used and the 
prospects for regionalism.  Conclusions and a summary of the major findings bring the 
paper to a close. 
 
 
2.  The Context 
 
Oceania  encompasses  a  third  of  the  planet‘s  surface.    Pre-colonization,  its  rich  and 
diverse  marine  resources,  such  as  whales  and seals,  and  its  labor  which  served  as 
sailors on ships and slaves on plantations, attracted traders from the West.
2  The initial 
carving up of the Pacific was motivated by contests for these resources, strategic ports, 
and  in  pursuit  of  congregations  for  the  churches  of  the  colonizers.  The  security 
considerations of colonies in Australia and New Zealand also featured prominently in the 
final carve-up.  The two world wars led to a rehashing of colonial claims to the islands, 
but  not  the  territorial  boundaries  of  the  islands.    Decolonization  since  the  mid-
20th century has left the region with 26 self-governing states.  These now comprise the 
membership  of  the  Pacific  Community  (PC),  the  first  of  two  supra-structure 
organizations.    A  subset  of  14  independent  states,  plus Australia  and New  Zealand, 
comprise the membership of the PIF, the other major supra-structure organization.   
 
The present-day Pacific Islands comprise a diverse group of states (Table 1).  Figures 
from 2007, the most recent year available, show that national populations range from 
1,398  in  Niue  to  6.3  million  in  Papua  New  Guinea.    Total  land  area  ranges  from 
21 square  kilometers  (Nauru)  to  452,380  square  kilometers  (Papua  New  Guinea).  
Cultural and linguistic differences, many founded on traditional boundaries, within the 
larger  Melanesian  societies  impede  communications  and  exchanges.  The  large 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs) that span the southern Pacific Ocean are a common 
feature  of  the  islands;  a  common  colonial  history  and  shared  geography  is  another.  
Understanding  the  origins  of  these  states  and  territories  is  a  pre-requisite  to 
understanding groupings and sub-groupings amongst them.   
 
The  narrative  of  a  sea  of  islands  conjures  up  images  of  a  deeply-integrated  island 
Pacific.  This  romanticizing  of  pre-colonization  regionalism  is  misleading  given  the 
limitations of communication and transportation at that time. This narrative is, however, a 
lot more realistic now.  National and territorial borders created after colonization impeded 
trade.  A decolonizing Pacific had aspirations of becoming a deeply integrated region.  
                                                            
2  The region continues to provide sea fearers for international shipping.  Remittances comprise a 
large proportion of export earnings in several Pacific Island nations (Connell and Brown, 2005).  
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Such  aspirations  were  first  aired  at  the  inaugural  meeting  of  the  PIF  in  1972.  
Regionalism  was  more  recently  raised  on  the  PIF-leaders‘  agenda  in  1999 
(Strokirch, 2002).  Leaders  expressed  their  collective  desire  for  greater  regional 
cooperation and integration at their Auckland meeting of April 2004. The Pacific Plan, 
which  aimed  to  ―enhance  and  stimulate  economic  growth,  sustainable  development, 
good governance, and security for Pacific countries through regionalism,‖ was endorsed 
a year later (Strokirch, 2002).  The  Pacific  Plan  includes  a timeframe of  10 years  to 
realize this goal.   
 
Economic integration is being pursued through several preferential trading agreements.
3  
The motivations for  such  arrangements  are  complex.    Several  Pacific  Island  nations 
have flirted with protectionism as a means to raise growth. A few, however, have retained 
an  open  stance  towards  international  trade,  while  several  others,  including  the  Fiji 
Islands, have embarked upon a mission of liberalizing the goods trade over the past 
decade.  Small states, according to international trade theory, have a vested interest in 
pursuing  free  trade  policies.    Why  then  do  small  states  of  the  island  Pacific  need 
institutions  to  induce  adoption  of  policies  in  support  of  free  trade?    The  theory  is 
unambiguous  in  terms  of  the  gains  that  accrue  to  a  small  economy  from  free  trade 
regardless of the policy stance of the trading partner.  Furthermore, why do the members 
of  the  PIF  need  agreements  such  as  the  Pacific  Agreement  on  Closure  Economic 
Relations (PACER) and Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA) to ensure 
compliance  with  trade  liberalization,  given  that  such  a  commitment  ―is  incentive 
compatible for a small country?‖
4 One could turn to history and path dependence as 
possible explanations, but these are not a sufficient explanation for the absence of free 
trade  policies  within  PIF  countries.    Article  8  of  PACER,  for  example,  allows  for  a 
unilateral shift to free trade by any member.  This paper attempts to shed some light on 
these questions.  
 
Geography, history, and economics together have influenced the course of regionalism 
within the Pacific Islands.  As the most isolated and difficult region to reach from Western 
Europe,  the  Pacific  Islands  were  colonized  in  the  middle  of  the  19
th  century,  some 
300 hundred  years  after  the  colonization  of  Africa,  the  Americas,  Asia,  and  the 
Caribbean.  Economic incentives for the utilization of the abundant natural resources 
played a central role in establishing contacts between the islands and the islanders on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  western  explorers  and  traders  on  the  other.    Geography, 
commerce,  and  strategic  interests  continue  to  influence regionalism  within  the  island 
Pacific.  These same forces are likely to shape future regionalism. 
 
 
3.  Partitioning of the Pacific Islands 
 
This section provides a summary of colonization and the process of the partitioning of 
the Pacific Islands, which led to the creation of a large number of states and territories. 
                                                            
3  Independent  of  policy-induced  motivations  for  integration,  growth  of  private  commerce  including 
those in aviation, shipping, and telecommunications are all helping with regional integration. 
4        Eichengreen (2009).    
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Colonial  history,  as  explained  later,  also  determined  the  boundaries  of  the  Pacific 
Islands.   
 
3.1  Why Several Small Sovereign States? 
 
Geography is the reason why the Pacific was colonized by Europeans last.  European 
trading routes to Asia and the Americas were well-established by the time the first British 
settlers set foot in Australia on 11 December 1792 (Grattan, 1963).  Reaching the Pacific 
Ocean required sailing around South America‘s hazardous Cape Horn, since the route 
via Asia required a detour around Australia or passage through the Torres Straight, the 
thin strip of ocean between the northern tip of Australia and the island of New Guinea, 
which  had  yet  to  be  discovered  by  Europeans.  The  explorations  into  the  region  by 
Europeans,  however,  were  persistent  and  driven  by  the  search  for  Terra  Australis 
Incognita, a large southern continent believed to exist to balance the landmass north of 
the equator.  Captain Cook, by circumnavigating the southern Pacific Ocean, demolished 
this myth in 1773.   
 
European settlement and trade with the Pacific Islands began in the early 19
th century.  
While Magellan first crossed the Pacific Ocean in the early 16
th century, landing in Guam 
in 1521, European commerce with the Pacific Islands, which were located far to the 
southwest  of  Guam,  was  delayed  for  an  additional  300  years.    Englishman  Samuel 
Wallis  reached  Tahiti  in  1776  and  Frenchman  Louis  Antoine  de  Bougainville,  who 
followed Wallis to Tahiti, made several landfalls in Melanesia subsequently (Kiste, 1994). 
It was English explorer Captain Cook, however, who finally sailed (ploughed) through 
much of the unexplored Pacific, and in the process met his death in Hawaii in 1779.  
While Dutch, Spanish, and Portuguese explorers had made isolated visits to the Pacific 
Islands,  settlement  in  and  commerce  with  the  region  was  delayed  until  Australian 
settlement.  By then, European trading routes with Asia and the Americas were well-
established.  The first Portuguese had reached Asia in the early 16
th century.  They held 
Goa (India) from 1510 to 1961, Timor from 1613 to 1974, and Macao (People‘s Republic 
of China [PRC]) from 1557 to 1974 (Maddison, 2006).  Trading posts at Jaffna (Ceylon), 
Nagasaki (Japan), and Timor were well established by the mid-16
th century.   
 
The Pacific Island region, up until the mid-19th century was, in legal parlance, the high 
seas.  Pre-colonization, pillage was a practice that pervaded the Pacific Islands. The first 
expeditions into the Pacific Islands were via the north and driven largely by hunters, 
gatherers,  and  traders.  The  initial  commercial  contact  began  in  the  1790s,  between 
sealers  and  fur  traders  from  America  seeking  markets  for  their  harvests  in  China.  
Sandalwood, b’eche-de-mer, and coconut oil collectors followed soon after.  As trade 
grew, sailors disembarked on the islands to replenish food supplies, rest, seek shelter 
from  occasional  bad  weather,  and for  recreation—mostly  alcohol  and sex.   Whalers, 
while in the islands, traded, recruited, and dropped off ―hands,‖ sometimes deliberately 
to avoid paying wages.   Charles Darwin—the famous gatherer—sailed the Pacific in 
1835, via Tahiti and the Bay of Islands to Sydney on the Beagle, collecting specimens 
along the way.  At the peak of the whaling industry in 1850, there were more than 700 
American whaling vessels plying the Pacific Ocean (Grattan, 1963; Kiste, 1994). The 
commerce that accompanied Western ships also introduced the islanders to Western                                                   
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goods and influences.  In addition, guns and hitherto unknown diseases had a significant 
impact on island life (Grattan, 1963).   
 
Beachcombers—those who had jumped ship or survived shipwrecks—were amongst the 
first  to  settle  in  the  islands.    Escapees  from  British  and  French  penal  colonies  in 
Australia, the Norfolk Islands, and New Caledonia later joined them.  Consequently, the 
early  settlers,  as  a  group,  were  described  as  ―rogues…overly  fond  of  alcohol  and 
generally  of  unsavory  character‖  (Grattan,  1963).    They,  nonetheless,  played  an 
important role in island history by marrying locally, producing offspring, and acting as 
traders, advisers, and intermediaries between the local chiefs as well as with Europeans 
(Kiste,  1994).   They  supported  local  chiefs  in  warfare,  thus  helping  those  with  their 
blessings  to  expand  influence.    In  return,  they  earned  protection  and  privileges 
equivalent to that of an aristocracy (Grattan, 1963). 
 
Religious missionaries followed closely on the heels of the traders, whalers, and other 
early  settlers.  These  pioneering  folk  were  responsible  for  the  establishment  of 
indigenous  governments  in  many  of  the  islands.   The  first  missionaries  reached  the 
islands from the London Missionary Society, established in 1795, at the dawn of the 
19
th century.  The first religious pioneers arrived in Tahiti on 5 March 1797.  They then 
moved south to Tonga and slowly fanned out into the rest of the region.  Their mission 
was  to  bring  an  end  to  cannibalism,  which  was  being  widely  practiced  amongst  the 
Maoris in New Zealand and in many of the islands.
5  The missionaries used the strategy 
of anointing a King (nearly always a male), converting him to Christianity, promulgating 
laws in the name of the anointed King, and then using these new institutions for the 
introduction of western civilization.  This entailed abandonment of cannibalism, adoption 
of western clothing, and a transition to western norms of housing and work ethic.  The 
Protestants  missionaries,  in  particular,  took  an  active  interest  in  local  politics,  driven 
largely  by  pressures  from  the  home  office  to  become  self-sufficient.    Consequently, 
Protestant  missionaries  had  an  influential  role  in  shaping  the  monarchies  of  Hawaii, 
Tahiti, and Tonga (Kiste, 1994). 
 
Colonial history also explains demarcations of boundaries of what now is referred to as 
the Pacific Islands.  Initially, European anthropologists divided the people of the Pacific 
Islands into three cultural groups: Melanesia, Micronesia, and Polynesia.  Melanesia, 
translated  from  Greek  as  ―islands  of  black-skinned  people,‖  encompasses  the  larger 
volcanic islands where language and cultural affinities are the most diverse.  Polynesia 
(―many islands‖) covers the vast expanse of the Pacific Ocean, spanning north to south 
from  Hawaii  to  New  Zealand,  and  east  to  west  from  Easter  Island  to  Tokelau.  
Micronesia (―tiny islands‖) comprises mostly coral atolls northwest  of the  Fiji Islands. 
These divisions provided a convenient reference point for outsiders, and initially were 
abstractions for the islanders themselves.  The boundaries drawn between the groups, 
moreover, were arbitrary.  The cultural groupings created by Europeans, however, have 
stuck.  A century of use has now led Pacific Islanders to readily identify themselves as 
belonging  to  one  of  the  three  groupings.    Indeed,  they  constitute  a  major  force  for 
                                                            
5  Fiji Islands then was known as the Cannibal Islands.  
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regional sub-groupings.  The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and the Micronesian 
Leaders Summit are cases in point.   
 
Geography and endowments, once again, explain many of the differences between the 
peoples of the islands.  The linguistic diversity and dominance of subsistence agriculture 
within Melanesia, for example, is explained by their topology, size, and land fertility—all 
functions of the predominantly volcanic origins of these islands. The relatively recent 
migration of people to Polynesia from Southeast Asia, as argued in Diamond (1997), and 
the easy access to these islands by seafarers explains their cultural homogeneity.  The 
small  size  of coral  atolls together  with  their  limited  natural  endowments  explains  the 
Micronesian tendencies towards dispersed clans as a form of survival insurance.  The 
dispersion  is  ensured  via  matrilineal  inheritances  and  exogamous  practices  (Kiste, 
1994).  It would, however, be naïve to assume that every practice within the islands is 
explained by geography and endowments; however, those salient for this paper are.   
 
3.2  Security Fears as a Cohering Force for Regionalization 
 
The security fears of British colonies in Australia and New Zealand had a central role in 
the  annexation  of  many  islands  by  the  British  Crown.    These  pressures  intensified 
following the expansionary pursuits of Germany and France into Africa, and forays by the 
United States (US) into the Pacific region.  Australian colonialists believed in geography 
as a being major determinant of their security, thus they consistently argued for British 
annexation of the islands in the surrounding southwest Pacific.  They pointed out to the 
Colonial  Office  in  London  that  the  security  of the  colonies  would  be  compromised  if 
neighboring  islands  fell  into  non-British  hands.    This  was  best  demonstrated  by  a 
resolution passed  on  5 December  1883  in  Sydney  collectively  by  the Australian  and 
New Zealand colonies, which stated that the presence of any foreign power south of the 
equator  would  be  ―injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  Empire‖  (Grattan,  1963).    This 
resolution followed a refusal by the United Kingdom (UK) to support Queensland in its 
annexation of New Guinea. 
 
In general, annexation of the Pacific Islands was incoherent (and regionalism, as shown 
later,  no  better).    New  Zealand  was  annexed  by  the  UK  in  1840,  following  initial 
settlement from Australia (Grattan, 1963).  Competition between the Protestant (British) 
and  Catholic  (French)  branches  of  Christianity  triggered  annexation  of  the  remaining 
islands—first  by  France  of  Marquesas  Island  in  September  1842,  then Tahiti  in April 
1843, and finally New Caledonia in 1853.  It was the last that upset the Australian and 
New Zealand colonies the most and led to a concerted push for the UK to annex islands 
in their vicinity.  As a result, the Fiji Islands was annexed by the UK in 1874.  Germany 
annexed the eastern portion of New Guinea a decade later, declared protectorates over 
the Marshall Islands and Eastern Micronesia in 1885, and added Nauru to its empire in 
1886.  Australian concerns of being flanked by two non-English powers (Germany to the 
north in New Guinea and France to the east in New Caledonia) led the UK to annex the 
southeastern half of New Guinea Island and by 1892 to declare protectorates over Cook 
Islands, Phoenix Islands, Tokelau, Gilbert and Ellice Islands, and Solomon Islands.   
 
The defeat of Spain in 1898 by the US in the Spanish–American War led to the American 
acquisition  of  the  Philippines  and  Guam,  and  the  transfer  of  Spanish  Micronesia  to  
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Germany (Kiste, 1994).  The partitioning of Samoa, Tonga, and Niue between Germany, 
the UK, and the US was completed as part of a pact in 1899.
6  Niue was made a British 
protectorate in 1900, and, together with Cook Islands, annexed to New Zealand in 1901.  
New Hebrides (Vanuatu) was brought under a joint British and French naval commission 
as  a  condominium  in  1906. Australia  assumed  administration  of  Papua  (British  New 
Guinea) in 1906. Thus, by the beginning of the 20
th century, the Pacific Islands were 
occupied by seven colonial powers: Australia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand,  the  UK,  and  the  US  (through  its  victory  over  Spain).  At  the  outbreak  of 
World War I, Australia and New Zealand took over German territories in New Guinea and 
Samoa, respectively, while Japan took control of Micronesia, which was later lost to the 
US in World War II. 
 
The annexation of the Fiji Islands highlights the key considerations that factored in the 
colonization of the Pacific Islands.  The British, while initially loathe to take on another 
colony, agreed to annex the Fiji Islands for three principal reasons. The first was the 
availability of abundant alluvial land that was considered suitable for growing cotton, the 
supplies of which to the UK had been curtailed due to the US Civil War.  The second was 
to halt the practice of ―black-birding,‖ the pejorative term used to describe the labor trade 
from the islands for sugarcane plantations in the Fiji Islands and Queensland (Australia) 
(Bromilow, 1929). The Queensland parliament, following widespread media reports of 
abuses both in recruitment and repatriation of workers supposedly hired on contract, 
passed the Pacific Islander Protection Act in June 1872 to curtail the reported abuses 
(Docker,  1970).
7    Finally,  fears  of  a  major  breakout  of  inter-tribal  warfare  in  the  Fiji 
Islands led the Australian colonies to press for annexation by the UK.  These fears were 
well-founded given that a rebellion in 1873 was quelled by a naval ship from Australia 
that  was  called  in  at  the  request  of  John Thurston,  the  Secretary  in  the  indigenous 
(Cakobau)  government.   Australian  parliamentarians  had  pressed  for  annexation.  Sir 
Hercules Robinson, then the Governor of New South Wales, went to the Fiji Islands on 
behalf of the Colonial Office in London to negotiate the conditions for cessation.  He 
assumed governorship after the conditions for annexation were accepted.   
 
The Fiji Islands‘ experience is equally informative of the problems faced by pioneering 
indigenous  governments.    Missionaries  first  reached  the  Fiji  Islands  in  1829,  but 
significant progress was only achieved in 1854 when Cakobau, the anointed  Tui Viti 
(King of the Fiji Islands) who was previously a warlord and a feared cannibal by his 
rivals, was converted to Christianity.  The first European settlement was established in 
1804 when several convicts escaped from Botany Bay in New South Wales and found 
their way to  the  Fiji Islands  (Burton, 1910).  Charles Savage, a ship wrecked sailor, 
joined them about 5 years later.  The westerners, with their large stock of ammunition, 
helped Cakobau expand his military prowess.  The Bible was subsequently translated 
into Bauan, the language used on Bau, the (small) island kingdom of Cakobau.  Bauan 
later became the official language with Cakobau proclaiming his rule over the Fiji Islands 
in 1867 (Burton, 1910; Grattan, 1963).  By 1874, mounting fiscal problems, deteriorating 
                                                            
6  The deal took into account the geopolitical interests of the powers both within the region and in 
Africa. 
7  This Act was commonly referred to as the Anti-Kidnapping Act.  
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law and order, and an eminent challenge to his authority led Cakobau, on advice of his 
British  advisors,  to  request  cessation  to  Queen  Victoria.  The  concept  of  indigenous 
government, until then hailed by the British, had failed.   
 
3.3  Decolonization to Multiple Sovereigns 
 
The  process  of  decolonization  began  in  1962  with  the  independence  of  Western 
Samoa.
8  Cook Islands chose self-government in a free association with New Zealand in 
1965.    Nauru  gained  independence  in  1968.    Tonga  withdrew  from  being  a  British 
protectorate in 1970.  The Fiji Islands was granted independence in 1970, Papua New 
Guinea in 1975, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu (formerly Ellice Islands) in 1978, Kiribati 
(formerly Gilbert Islands) in 1979, and Vanuatu (formerly New Hebrides) in 1980.
9  The 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) and Marshall Islands were granted independence 
in 1986, and Palau in 1994.  The last three chose to remain separate sovereigns, but 
entered into a Compact of Free Association (CFA) with the US at independence.
10  The 
CFA gives US veto powers on foreign policies, provides for aid, and allows the islanders 
unrestricted  access  to  the  US  labor  market.    At  the  beginning  of  the  20
th  century, 
American Samoa, Guam, and Hawaii remained dependent territories of the US; New 
Caledonia  and  French  Polynesia  of  France;  while,  Dutch  New  Guinea  became  the 
Indonesian province of Irian Jaya.
11 
 
Thus, the forces that led to the creation of nation states within the island Pacific evolved 
through religious and territorial contests between the major powers  of the era.  This 
process was shaped by contests for congregations between the Protestants (English) 
and  Catholics  (French),  the  geopolitical  considerations  of  France  and  the  UK,  and 
security concerns of British colonies in Australia and New Zealand.  Resources such as 
land, labor, and mineral deposits (e.g., nickel in the case of New Caledonia) also played 
a role.  The continuing security fears of Australia and New Zealand, and the more recent 
aspirations of the islanders to extend and better exploit their maritime resources have 




4.  Institutions for Regionalism 
 
There  are  a  multitude  of  organizations  and  agreements  for  regional  integration  and 
cooperation  amongst  the  26  self-governing  states  and  territories  of  the  Pacific.    A 
comprehensive discussion of each is impractical.  The discussion that follows considers 
the  main  supra-structure  and  infrastructure  organizations,  and  preferential  trading 
                                                            
8  Samoa dropped Western from its name in 1997. 
9  There were no serious demands for independence, though murmurs were being made in some 
quarters. 
10  Reasons why these nations chose not to form a ―Federated States of Micronesia‖ from the US Trust 
Territories are complex, but the process can be summed up as nationalism having prevailed over 
regionalism for this group of islands.  Analogous arguments hold for the division of Tuvalu and 
Kiribati from the former UK Trust Territory of Gilbert and Ellice Islands. 
11  Dutch New Guinea became Irian Jaya, a province of Indonesia on 1 May 1963.   
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agreements.  An inventory, albeit incomplete as of July 2009, of each of the above-
mentioned is presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  Similarly, there are  eight  preferential 
trading agreements (Table 4), plus an overarching Pacific Plan that amongst other things 
includes regionalism as its goal. 
 
The  underlying  motivations  for  the  creation  of  regional  organizations  were  to  pool 
capacity so as to give the region a collective voice in international forums, draw benefits 
from economies of scale, and provide for regional public goods such as management of 
oceanic resources.  The organizations discussed below have similarities in mandate, 
membership,  and  sponsors.    Efforts  at  rationalization  of  regional  organizations  were 
underway at the time of writing.   
 
4.1  Supra-Structure Organizations 
 
The major supra-structure organizations and their respective memberships are listed in 
Table 2, and organized in the chronological order of their establishment to help with the 
discussion of the evolution of regionalism. This list, given the current state of flux of 
regional  organizations,  is  not  exhaustive,  however.   The  26  self-governing  territories 
comprise the membership of the Pacific Community and are served by the Secretariat of 
the  Pacific  Community  (SPC).    Australia,  France,  New  Zealand,  and  the  US  are 
members of the SPC, given their respective locations and territorial claims within the 
region.  However, they are different from the rest of the independent states in terms of 
their income and size.  A subset of the region‘s 16 independent states, excluding France 
and the US, make up the membership of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF).  PIF is served 
by its own secretariat, the Pacific Island Forum Secretariat (PIFS).  While SPC and PIFS 
are the two major supra-structure institutions encompassing the region, four other sub-
regional  groupings  exist.  These  groupings  were  formed  around  a  common  colonial 
history,  shared  interest,  and  notions  of  cultural  affinity.  The  Pacific  Island  Council  of 
Leaders  (PICL)  constitutes  the  governing  council  of  the  Hawaii-based  and  US-
sponsored  Pacific  Island  Development  Program  (PIDP).  The  Melanesian  Spearhead 
Group comprises just the Melanesian states.  The FSM has its own Leaders‘ Summit.  
Interest in a shared ocean and the resources therein has been another cohering force, 
both for regionalism and sub-regionalism. The eight  Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA) are drawn together by their common and collective interest in managing tuna that 
swim their respective EEZs.   
 
Sub-groupings  of  supra-structure  organizations  can  be  better  comprehended  by 
considering the four gradations of sovereignty within the region: 
 
(i)  The 16 independent states with full sovereignty, including complete jurisdiction 
over their foreign policy. 
(ii)  Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the FSM, and Palau have a CFA with the 
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defense  matters,‖  including  the  option  to  ―foreclose  access  to  or  use  of‖  the 
members‘ territories by a third country.
12 
(iii) Cook Islands, Tokelau, and Niue are Governed in  Free  Association with New 
Zealand  (GFANZ),  which  means  that  their  external  relations  are  managed  by 
New Zealand.  Furthermore, the residents of these islands carry New Zealand 
passports. 
(iv) The French territories of Polynesia and New Caledonia, and that of American 
Samoa, are still under colonial rule.   
 
The  reasons  for  the  creation  of  the  South  Pacific  Commission  (henceforth  the 
Commission) and PIF are instructive in understanding the forces supporting regionalism.  
The former  was  a  product  of the  aspirations for  a  ―new  world  order,‖  created  in the 
immediate aftermath of World War II.
13  Decolonization led to the establishment of the 
SPC in 1998.  The Commission was created in February 1947 at a meeting in Canberra 
between the six colonial powers of the region—Australia, France, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, the UK, and the US—to coordinate research on economic, health, and social 
development (Herr, 1994; Doran 2004).  This colonial construct defined the Pacific Island 
region, from the Northern Marianas to Minerva Reef, and from Palau to Pitcairn Island.  
Funding and governance arrangements were also put in place at inception.  An advisory 
body  in  the  form  of  the  South  Pacific  Conference,  comprising  delegates  from  the 
individual island states and territories, was set up.  Political considerations, however, 
were  placed  outside  the mandate  of the  Commission.  This constraint,  in the  era of 
decolonization when island leaders agitated for self-determination, led to the creation of 
a  second  regional  organization,  the  PIF.    Opposition  to  French  nuclear  tests  in  the 
Pacific, attempts by Japan to dump nuclear waste close to the FSM, and drift net fishing 
by distant-water nations, all of which are politically sensitive issues, consolidated PIF‘s 
contributions to regionalism.  
 
The South Pacific Island Forum (SPIF) was established in 1971 and its origins lay in the 
Pacific Island Planters Association (PIPA) formed by the Fiji Islands, Tonga, and Western 
Samoa—the independent states at the time—to pursue better prices for banana exports 
to New Zealand.  The need for a second supra-structure organization became evident 
following France‘s objections in the Commission to discussions on the environmental 
hazards of nuclear testing.  This led to a meeting in Wellington amongst the independent 
states and the birth of SPIF (Doran, 2004).  The subsequent independence of northern 
Pacific states and their joining SPIF led the organization to change its name to PIF in 
2000.  The fact that PIF allows for unfettered political debate means that its membership 
is constrained to sovereign states only.
14   
                                                            
12  Public  Law  108-188;  17 December  2003  accessed  online  on  29 July  2009 at: http://www.rmiem 
bassyus.org/Compact/Compact%20Public%20Law%20108-188.pdf.  
 
13  The Pacific theater remains a vivid part of World War II memorials in Australia, New Zealand, and 
the USA. 
14  The espoused purpose of PIF is to ―strengthen regional cooperation and integration, including the 
pooling of regional resources of governance and the alignment of policies, in order to further Forum 
1    
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The capacity and freedom to participate in political debates distinguishes the SPC from 
the  PIF.    This  difference  provides  each  of  the  above-mentioned  a  slightly  different 
constituency.  The SPC‘s  membership comprises all independent and self-governing 
states of the Pacific region, and that of four metropolitan powers:  Australia, France, New 
Zealand, and the US.
15  This gives the SPC comprehensive geographic coverage of the 
Pacific Island region.  PIF, in contrast, has a restricted membership but is unconstrained 
in terms of issues it can cover.  Both supra-structure organizations owe their existence to 
similar motivations.  Thus, there is significant overlap in their mandates.   
 
PIFS and SPC share a common mandate to help their memberships promote economic 
and social development (Fry, 1981).  However, over time they have differentiated their 
offerings whilst attempting to cooperate in areas of overlap.  PIFS has specialized in 
policy advice and, as the custodian of the Pacific Plan, in coordinating efforts across 
regional organizations.  SPC is specializing in providing technical advice, including the 
provision of data on economic and social development, and the management of natural 
resource.    PIF  has  redefined  itself  as  the  pre-eminent  political  supra-structure 
organization while PIFS, as the gatekeeper to PIF, retains a monopoly on access to the 
leaders as a group.  Consequently, decisions impinging on national sovereignty have 
fallen within the remit of PIF.  For example, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands, which involved the posting of peacekeepers in 2003 to end the conflict, was 
undertaken  via  the  PIF.    Similarly,  cajoling  the  Fiji  Islands  towards  democratic  rule 
following  the  last  coup  has  also  been  on  the  PIF  agenda.  The  limited  geographic 
coverage of the PIF handicaps it from providing regional public goods, however.
16  SPC 
fills  this  void.
17  Thus,  SPC  has  gravitated  towards  being  the  premier  technical 
organization for the region.   
 
Regionalism,  it  has  been  claimed,  is  an  inevitable  process  in  the  Pacific  Islands.
18  
Regionalism is seen by some as providing a common political platform for the leaders of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
members‘  shared  goals  of  economic  growth,  sustainable  development,  good  governance,  and 
security‖ (PIF, 2005; Article II). 
 
15  The UK withdrew its membership from the SPC in 1996 as part of its overall withdrawal from the 
region in the aftermath of the Cold War.  
16  This  has been partly  ameliorated  through  associate  membership  of  New  Caledonia and  French 
Polynesia, which was allowed only in 2006.   
17  Another noteworthy difference is that the PIF, unlike the SPC, lacks a legal personality as it is not 
constituted under a formal treaty between the members. 
18  The  Secretary  General  of  PIFS,  in  his  address  to  the  40
th  PIF  leaders  meeting  held  in  Cairns, 
Australia on 5 August 2009 noted: ―The experience of the Forum in your past 39 meetings, points to 
the inevitability of togetherness. The Pacific is at its best when it acts as a region. In times of crisis it 
is the natural way. It is the very essence of the Pacific Way. This spirit of the region which informs 
the Pacific Plan adopted by Leaders at your 34
th meeting in 2005, and this remains a guiding force 
in  the  work  of  the  Secretariat  and  other  regional  agencies.  The  work  of  the  Secretariat  now 
encompasses  the  full  range  of  political  governance  and  security,  trade  and  economic,  and 
development  coordination  issues.  In  the  face  of  the  global  economic  crisis  there  is  a  declared 
determination  on  the  part  of  the  Council  of  Regional  Organisations  of  the  Pacific  (CROP)  to 
strengthen  the  coordination  of  our  institutional  activities  in  every  way  possible.‖  Available  at 
http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/newsroom/speeches/2009-1/statement-by-sg-slade-opening-of-
40th-pif.html.  
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small  island  states;  others  see  it  as  an  instrument  for  economic  integration.    The 
espoused  benefits  include  economies  of  scale  in  the  delivery  of  public  goods  and 
services, as well as the collective management of regional commons such as security 
and oceanic resources.  Integration was sought during the colonial era so as to reduce 
the cost of providing administrative services across the region.   The UK created the 
position of a High Commissioner for Western Pacific, based in Suva, in 1875 to oversee 
the conduct of British subjects resident in the region.  The desire to bring about more 
rapid  development  in  the  region  as  a  whole  was  another  unifying  force.    Shared 
geography and cultural space, it was argued, offered both lessons and opportunities for 
interventions to induce faster rates of economic growth.   
 
There are at least six other supra-structure organizations.  Their memberships differ on 
the basis of their colonial histories, with the CFA and GFANZ being cases in point; on 
cultural affinities such as the MSG and Micronesian Chief Executives Summit; and, on 
common  shared  resources  such  as  deep  sea  fisheries  (PNA).    The  overlapping 
mandates of these organizations and intertwined governance mechanisms complicate 
an assessment of the effectiveness of these institutions.  Moreover, a comprehensive 
review  of  the  effectiveness  of  six  Council  of  Regional  Organisations  in  the  Pacific 
(CROP)  agencies  was  recently  undertaken,  making  another  similar  assessment 
redundant.
19  Furthermore, two detailed studies have been completed with the goal of 
rationalizing regional institutions.
20  The recommendations were in the process of being 
implemented as of July 2009, which is an issue elaborated upon later in the text. 
 
4.2  Infrastructure Organizations 
 
Pacific Island regional institutions have been founded on specific themes on the basis of 
need.   Thus,  they  lack  a  coherent  design.   The  major  infrastructure  institutions  that 
existed as of July 2009 included the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), Pacific Forum Line 
(PFL), Pacific Island Finance and Technical Assistance Centre (PFTAC), South Pacific 
Island Applied Geo-science Commission (SOPAC), South Pacific Board for Educational 
Assessment (SPBEA), South Pacific Regional Environmental Program (SPREP), and 
the University of the South Pacific (USP) (Table 3).
21  The largest six of the infrastructure 
organizations are covered in this discussion.  They are divided into those established 
with the motivation of jointly managing regional commons, pooling regional resources, 




                                                            
19  This  review  was  commissioned  jointly  by  the  Australian  and  New  Zealand  aid  agencies  and 
referenced as Hewitt and Constantine (2008).   The author was given access to the draft report 
dated  31  October  2008,  but  in  confidence  only.    This  paper  thus  refrains  from  making  specific 
observations from the draft report. 
20  This work is referred to as the Regional Institutional Framework (RIF) and are referenced here as 
Hughes (2005) and Tavola et al. (2006).   
21  Others include Pacific Aviation Safety Office (PASO), Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility (PRIF), 
and the South Pacific Tourism Organization.  
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(i) Organizations created to manage regional commons 
 
Amongst the offshoots of the supra-structure institutions, FFA, SOPAC, and SPREP are 
the most significant.
22  FFA, established in 1979, was conceived at the PIF  Leaders‘ 
Summit in 1978.  Its creation followed the third United Nations Conference on the Law of 
the Sea, with PIF membership recognizing the importance of their control of offshore 
resources.
23  The perceived need to regulate the distant-water fishing activities of the 
Soviet Union; US; Japan; Republic of Korea (Korea); and Taipei,China was the cohering 
force.
24  PNA curtails membership to nations with jurisdiction over the most fertile tuna 
grounds.  A similar motivation led to the formation of the Committee for Coordination of 
Joint  Prospecting  for  Mineral  Resources  in  the  South  Pacific,  the  predecessor  to 
SOPAC.  SPREP had a more complicated parentage, being a product of partnerships 
between member governments, the SPC, the Forum Secretariat, and the United Nations 
Environment Programme.  The ongoing Regional Institutional Framework (RIF) exercise 
acknowledges duplication and opportunities for rationalization amongst the above listed.  
At the time of writing, negotiations were underway to absorb SPBEA into SPC, and to 
split  SOPAC  such  that  one  component  would  be  absorbed  into  SPREP  and  the 
remainder into SPC. 
 
(ii) Organizations created to pool services 
 
Amongst the early infrastructure organizations created were the Fiji School of Medicine 
(established in 1885), USP (1968), Pacific Forum Shipping Line (1977), SPBEA (1980), 
and PFTAC (1993).  The first of these became a national institution at decolonization.  
USP  was  created  following  a  recommendation  by  a  study  commissioned  by  the 
governments  of  Australia,  New  Zealand,  and  the  UK  for  the  establishment  of  an 
autonomous regional university to serve the needs of the English-speaking countries of 
the South Pacific.  The Royal New Zealand Air Force, which then owned a large base in 
Suva,  Fiji  Islands,  donated  the  land  and  buildings  for  this  purpose.    The  British 
government provided £1.25 million as seed capital.   
 
USP‘s experience is illustrative of the challenges facing regional institutions.  As of 2009, 
it had a total recurrent budget of approximately F$135 million.  Of the total, F$50 million 
was  made  up  of  member  contributions  and  determined  by  the  share  of  full-time 
equivalent student enrollment from the respective country in the previous 2 years.  The 
Fiji Islands, one of a dozen members, contributed F$38 million to this sum.  Another 
F$25 million was collected as fee income from students.
25  The remainder was made up 
                                                            
22  This is far from an exhaustive list.  PASO has already been established and other organizations 
designed to provide regional services for audit, public finance, and economic management are at 
various stages of formation. 
   
23  This law defines an island as ―a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above 
water at high tide.‖ (Park, 2004).   
24  There  was  considerable  debate  on  the  inclusion  of  the  US.    Leaders  finally  agreed  to  restrict 
membership in FFA to the island members plus Australia and New Zealand (Fry, 1981). 
25  Data provided by the Vice Chancellor Professor Rajesh Chandra and corroborated with information 
from  http://www.usp.ac.fj/fileadmin/files/academic/bursary/finance/Government_Grant_-_2009.pdf.   
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of  donor  contributions  and  other  income.    At  the  onset,  USP‘s  membership  was 
comprised  of  states  considered  too  small  to  justify  establishment  of  their  own 
universities.  This  position  has  changed  over  the  past  40  years,  however,  and  now 
Samoa and the Fiji Islands have established their own national universities.  It remains 
to  be  seen  as to  how  USP  will  evolve  given  the  emergence  of national  universities.  
However, the two broader lessons from USP‘s experience with regionalism are (i) donor 
funds  are  critical  to  their  establishment  and  sustenance,  and  (ii)  tensions  between 
regional and national provisions continue to shape these institutions and their offerings.
26 
   
The PFL was created with a view to having regular regional shipping services and to 
contain freight rates.
27  Unlike USP, however, PFL was designed to be run as a private 
company  with  equity  from  a  dozen  PIF  members.    The  perceived  benefits  from 
economies of scale were considered sufficient to defray costs of operation such that, 
once established, it was envisaged that PFL would deliver profits to its shareholders.  
However,  judging  the  effectiveness  of  PFL,  as  with  other  regional  organizations,  is 
extremely problematic.  PFL has run at a loss most of its life, having only delivered its 
first dividend 20 years after incorporation (Nightingale, 1998).  But then, it has met its 
mandate  of  providing  the  service  for  which  it  was  created.   Questions remain  as to 
whether this service would have existed in PFL‘s absence, and if so, at what cost.
28   
 
(iii) Organizations created to harmonize standards and for information sharing 
 
SPBEA was created in 1980 to harmonize school curricula and educational assessment.  
It has expanded its remit since then to house the Pacific Regional Qualifications Register 
with a view to facilitating the portability of qualifications across the region.  PFTAC and 
the statistical division within the SPC were created with a view to sharing policy lessons 
and data.  The technical expertise housed within these organizations and their links with 
other similarly endowed institutions outside of the region ensures that timely and quality 
services are rendered on demand.
29   
 
4.3  Facilitating and Other Regional Organizations 
 
In  additional  to  the  plethora  of  international  regional  organizations  sponsored  by 
governments, there are facilitating, civic/non-government, and commercial organizations.  
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has standalone offices in the Fiji Islands and Papua 
New Guinea, and shares offices with the World Bank in Samoa, Tonga, and Solomon 
Islands.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a regional presence via PFTAC in 
Suva, Fiji Islands.  And as of July 2009, 14 United Nations agencies had offices in Suva 
                                                            
26  Disruptions to classes following the 2000 military coup in the Fiji Islands led to a renewed push to 
spread services of USP to other centers, and potentially to establish national universities. 
 
27  A proposal for a regional airline failed due to a push by some nations to have national airlines. 
28  Many  island governments  run  their  own  shipping  lines or  subsidize  private  operators  to  service 
some routes. 
29  Information provided by Peter Forau and Feleti Teo, the two deputy secretary generals of PIFS, at 
an interview conducted for this paper.  




30  The World Bank has an office in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea.  In addition 
to the above, governors of the central banks meet annually.  The Fiji Islands and Papua 
New Guinea have active business councils that provide links with their Australian and 
New Zealand counterparts.  An active Pacific Conference of Churches integrates the 
activities  of the  churches  in  the  region.  Finally,  the  Pacific  Island  Non-Governmental 
Organisation (PIANGO) headquartered in Suva acts as the umbrella organization for its 
national affiliates. The picture of regional organizations is that of cascading umbrellas, all 
constituted to coordinate and integrate services within the many Pacific Island nations 
and  territories.  Many  of  the  region‘s  non-governmental  organizations  (NGOs)  also 
depend on donor funds for their sustenance. 
 
History explains the formation of the many states and territories of the Pacific Islands, 
and the several institutions for regionalism.  What hope is there for a single regional 
organization?  A Pacific Commission was once suggested to tackle this issue (Hughes, 
2005).  (Its prospects will be taken up in some detail later in the paper.)  Three recent 
reviews  have  pointed  to  the  duplication  of  services  and  wasteful  inter-organizational 
competition.  The Council of Regional Organizations in the Pacific (CROP), an umbrella 
body created to coordinate activities across the six largest regional organizations, was 
created  specifically  for  this  purpose.
31  This  is  not  enough,  however.   An  exercise  in 
developing an RIF, with the objective of reviewing ―the relevance and effectiveness of 
existing  regional  institutional  mechanisms‖  and  recommending  ―new  or  alternative 
institutional arrangements that best suit the region‘s needs and emerging priorities‖ was 
underway at the time of writing (Hughes, 2005).  RIF, moreover, is an offshoot of the 
Pacific Plan and has been a standing agenda item in PIF since 2006. 
 
4.4  Mechanisms for Integration—Preferential Trading Agreements and 
the Pacific Plan 
 
The efforts at deepening trade integration commenced in 1999 and have since picked up 
in  pace.    The  former  chairperson  of  PIF,  Australian  Prime  Minister  Kevin  Rudd, 
announced  at  the  organization‘s  40
th  annual  gathering  on  5  August  2009  the 
commencement  of  a  renewed  push  for  an  agreement  to  ―drive  closer  economic 
integration and advance progress towards the Millennium Development Goals.‖
32  
 
An inventory of the Pacific Islands major trading agreements in operation and their dates 
of creation is provided in Table 4.
33  A total of 14 Pacific Island nations are signatories to 
                                                            
30  These  include  the  Department  of  Safety  and  Security  (DSS),  ESCAP,  FAO,  ILO,  UNAIDS, 
UNCTAD, UNDP, UNDP-Pacific Centre, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIFEM, and WHO. 
  
31  Members of CROP include PIFS, SPC, FFA, SOPAC, SPREP, and USP. 
32  He  also  reiterated  Australia‘s  commitment  to  helping  its  island  neighbors  protect  fisheries, 
strengthen  maritime  security,  and  combat  transnational  crime.  Speech  available  at: 
http://www.forumsec.org.fj/pages.cfm/newsroom/speeches/2009-1/remarks-by-new-forum-chair-pm-
kevin-rudd-opening-of-40th-pif.html.  
33  South  Pacific  Regional  Trade  and  Economic  Cooperation  Agreement  (SPARTECA)  has  existed 
since 1981, but this is a non-reciprocal preferential trading agreement between PIF nations on the 
one hand and Australia and New Zealand on the other.  
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the  Cotonou  Agreement,  while  four  are  members  of  the  World  Trade  Organization 
(WTO).  Furthermore, sub-regional agreements in the form of the MSG, CFA, and Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) are also in existence.  Texts of the agreements for PACER 
and PICTA were finalized for signature at the heads of government meeting in Nauru in 
August 2001 (Appendix—Tables A2 and A3).  Both of these agreements seek to deepen 
trade integration. 
 
PICTA has the objective of progressively eliminating regulatory barriers to international 
trade ―with a view to the eventual creation of a single regional market among the Pacific 
Island economies.‖ (PICTA Agreement; Article 1, Clause [e]). PACER, in contrast, has, 
as  its  objective  the  ―gradual  and  progressive  integration  [of  PIF  nations]  into  the 
international economy‖ (PIFS, 2001; Article 2, paragraph 1) whilst providing economic 
and  technical  assistance  to  achieving  the  above  (Article  2,  paragraph 2,  clause  [d]).  
While PACER allows PIF nations to liberalize trade amongst themselves first, it gives a 
maximum of 8 years from inception before Australia and New Zealand are afforded the 
same liberalized trade privileges.  PACER, therefore, allows the PIF group of nations to 
integrate with the rest of the world, but with the proviso that Australia and New Zealand 
receive most-favored nation (MFN) treatment in this process and by 2011 at the latest.   
 
PICTA is envisaged as a stepping stone to deepened economic integration with Australia 
and New Zealand, and eventually the rest of the world.  PICTA and PACER both have 
timetables for trade liberalization and elaborate mechanisms in place for the resolution of 
disputes  amongst  the parties.  The  Pacific Island  Forum  Secretariat  (PIFS)  provides 
secretariat services for both of these agreements.  The Pacific Plan is a more ambitious 
project as it is an overarching agreement that seeks to unite the trade integration and 
developmental aspirations of the Pacific Island region as a whole.  PIF leaders endorsed 
it at their 2005 summit.  While extremely detailed in terms of policy interventions and 
actions by the PIFS, the effectiveness of the Plan is being questioned.   
 
A  recent  assessment  is  highly  critical  of  the  Plan‘s  progress  in  all  four  of  its  pillars: 
economic  growth,  sustainable  development,  good  governance,  and  security.    Baaro 
(2009) argues that too much attention has been placed on regional frameworks and 
processes, with insufficient attention being given to translating designs into actions.  It 
has been pointed out that the Plan is not adequately resourced,  and that there is a 
disconnect  between  regional  and  national  priorities.  The  architects  of  the  Plan,  it 
appears, omitted to argue the reasons for regional cooperation.
34  Thus, the Plan spells 
out detailed interventions, but without explanations provided as to why particular actors 
would want to cooperate in the first place.  In summary, the planners have paid little 
attention to incentives for cooperation.   
 
4.5  The Political Economy of Regionalism 
 
The island Pacific started off with a single (supra-structure) organization, the SPC.  In 
the 60 years since the SPC‘s inception, the region has spawned another five supra-
structure  organizations  (Table  2);  at  least  another  six  infra-structure  organizations 
                                                            
34  See Haggard (2009) on these incentives.  
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(Table 3);  and  nine  additional  regional  agreements,  all  with  the  aim  of  deepening 
integration (the eight listed in Table 4 plus the Pacific Plan).  Several more facilitating 
organizations  have  emerged  and  more  arise  as  time  progresses.    While  a 
comprehensive  inventory  is  difficult  to  compile,  there  is  little  evidence  of  the 
amalgamation of existing institutions or their abolition.  Thus, the evolutionary process of 
regionalism has been more characteristic of ―snow-balling,‖ rather than in the form of a 
―conveyor belt.‖   
 
A  consistent  feature  of  regionalism  within  the  Pacific  has  been  the  tension  between 
regionalism and nationalism.  This is particularly problematic for trade integration.  Is 
regional integration a substitute of or complement to globalization?  Is the duplication of 
services offered by regional organizations helpful or harmful to their respective causes?  
Why has there been a proliferation of regional institutions in the post-colonial Pacific 
Islands?  And why is it so difficult to dismantle regional organizations?  These are some 
of the questions addressed next. 
 
It is instructive to explore reasons why regional organizations, once created, are difficult 
to dismantle.  The Pacific Island region and the ongoing RIF exercise, in particular, serve 
as  a  laboratory  experiment  for  this  notion.    Each  regional  organization,  following  its 
establishment, creates three sets of stakeholders: the employees of the organization, the 
host government, and the major sponsors and donors.  
 
The  cannibalization  of  SOPAC  by  SPC  and  SPREP  is  particularly  instructive  on  the 
political  economy  of this  process.   While  SOPAC  was  highly  successful  in  attracting 
donor funds and expanding its remit, these ultimately lead to its demise.  Hughes (2005) 
noted that ―SOPAC is producing valuable work, but it is a less happy story in terms of 
Pacific regional cooperation.‖ The problem, Hughes argues, is that SOPAC‘s expansion 
of its role and functions was achieved at the cost of the effectiveness of regionalism as a 
whole.  He recommended that SOPAC be absorbed into the Environment, Climate, and 
Earth Science Directorate of the newly proposed Pacific Commission by 2007.  A second 
and  subsequent  review  by  Tavola  et  al.  (2006),  while  broadly  in  agreement  with the 
analysis in Hughes (2005), argued instead for a three-pillared regional organizational 
structure: political, technical, and academic.  These pillars were to comprise (i) PIFS, (ii) 
SPC, and (iii) the three regional tertiary institutions as the last pillar.
35  Their roles were 
also clarified:  PIFS was to remain the interlocutor with the leaders, SPC was to provide 
technical  services,  and  the tertiary  institutions were  to remain  as  they  were.  It  was 
recommended that these changes be put into effect by January 2009.   
 
The outputs of RIF have been different from what was originally recommended.  The 
timelines for the changes to be put into effect have also slipped.  Understanding the 
reasons for  these  slippages  requires  an  appreciation  of  the  stakeholder  dynamics  in 
these  negotiations.   At  its  2007  meeting,  PIF  accepted  the  recommendations  of  the 
Tavola et al. review, but with the following changes: (i) FFA remain in pillar 1, ostensibly 
to provide fisheries a political profile; (ii) that functions of SOPAC are absorbed into SPC 
                                                            
35  Hughes (2005) had left the educational institutions outside of the proposed Pacific Commission.  
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and SPREP; and (iii) SPBEA merge into SPC.
36  At its 2008 meeting, PIF instructed the 
chief executive officers (CEOs) of SOPAC, SPBEA, SPC, and SPREP to work together 
under the chairmanship of the Secretary General of the PIFS to present PIF a plan and 
implementation  schedule  at  their  2009  meeting.    They  also  agreed  to  instruct  their 
representatives on the governing councils of the four agencies to be merged to ―take all 
the final decisions on the new institutional arrangements and implementation plans, with 
implementation to commence immediately after the Governing Council meetings and no 
later than 1 January 2010.‖
37  The decision of the CEOs made in July 2009, and included 
as Annex 1 in this paper, was endorsed by PIF at its 40
th annual meeting. 
 
SOPAC was extremely successful in expanding its niche and in attracting donor funding. 
Typically, this would be the hallmark of a successful enterprise.  This instead was the 
reason for its demise. According to stakeholders interviewed, regional politics played a 
major role in precipitating this outcome.  Allegedly, FFA was saved because of the strong 
support of the host government.  The case was helped by the fact that FFA is one of the 
very few regional organizations based in Solomon Islands.  Similarly, SPREP is one of a 
handful of regional organizations headquartered in Samoa.  The Samoan government is 
alleged to have argued likewise – that is, SPREP should not be dismantled as it is one of 
the few resident regional organizations in Apia.  SOPAC, in contrast, is headquartered in 
Suva, home to several regional organizations.  Compounding the problems for SOPAC 
was  the  failure  of  the  military  government  in  the  Fiji  Islands  to  attend  PIF  meetings 
beginning in 2007.  This fact left SOPAC without a major stakeholder to argue against its 
dismantling.  Could SOPAC have been a casualty of the Fiji Islands coup of 2006?   
 
Meanwhile,  new  regional  institutions  continue  to  emerge.    A  new  Pacific  Regional 
Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) was set up in August 2008 by the governments of Australia 
and  New  Zealand,  ADB,  and  the  World  Bank.
38  A  total  of  A$200 million  has  been 
committed  over  a  4-year  period  to  PRIF,  which  has  the  goal  of  developing  and 
maintaining  critical  economic  infrastructure,  including  roads,  ports,  and  transport 
systems; energy and communications infrastructure; and water, sanitation, and waste 
management systems.  Access to PRIF is restricted to Kiribati, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu. 
 
The  institutions  for  regionalism  in  the  Pacific  Islands  are  in  a  state  of  flux.    Some 
institutions are being dismantled, others are being created, and several are redefining 
their  niche  for  survival.    Island  leaders,  together  with  those  from Australia  and  New 
Zealand,  are  demanding  better  value  for  the  resources  expended  on  the  many 
institutions  created  for  regionalism.  This  demand  for  reform,  restructure,  and 
rationalization  of  the  many  regional  arrangements  is  likely  to  gain  momentum.   And 
these  very  forces  will  shape  institutions  for  regionalism  over  the  foreseeable  future.  
Given the political nature of this process, the pace of reforms is likely to be slow.  The 
                                                            
36  See Forum Communiqué of 2007, Regional Institutional Framework, Paragraph 19. 
37  Forum Communiqué of 2008, paragraph 20(c). 
 
38  The position of the Deputy Manager for PRIF was advertised on page 18 of The Economist (15–
21 August 2009).  
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logic of the regional provision of public goods and a regional platform for the airing of 
common concerns to the international community will remain.  The case for a regional 
approach  to  trade  integration,  however,  is  weak. The  economic  case  for  preferential 
trading agreements amongst the islands themselves (e.g., PICTA) is weaker still.  One 
implication is that regionalism will gravitate towards providing regional public goods and 
act as a forum for the leaders, while trade integration will slowly devolve to the individual 
nation states.  Australia and New Zealand may play a role, particularly if they incorporate 
the  islands  within  their  CER  arrangement.  This  would  create  a  common  market  for 
Oceania as a whole. 
 
 
5.  Governance, Funding, and the Future  
 
The governing council of each of the regional organizations comprises representatives of 
the member states.  In the case of the supra-structure organizations, these comprise the 
island  leaders  themselves.   And  for  multilateral  infrastructure  organizations,  it  is  the 
nominees of the leaders and the stakeholders who constitute the governing body.  For 
example, the USP Council, the governing body for USP, comprises representatives from 
each  member  state,  the  staff,  and  students.    An  analogous  arrangement  exists  for 
NGOs.  PIANGO, as an example, has representatives on its board from the national 
NGO umbrella, which in turn have representatives from their own national constituents.   
 
The funding and accountability mechanisms  are more complex and opaque. What is 
clear,  however,  is the fact  that island membership contributions constitute  a minority 
share in the total budget of most regional organizations.  Taking the total 2005 budget for 
five  regional  organizations  as  an  illustration,  contributions  from  island  membership 
amounted to 28% for FFA, 25% for PIFS, 30% for SOPAC, 10% for SPC, and 36% for 
SPREP  (Hughes,  2005).    Similar  imbalances  prevail  for  many  of  the  NGOs.    The 
implications of such heavy reliance on donor funding include the following: (i) regional 
organizations beholden to the agendas, perceived or otherwise, of their major sponsors; 
(ii)  competition  amongst  organizations  for  the  same  sources  of  funds;  and,  (iii) 
accountability for deliverables being shifted from the clients to the funders, noting the 
fact that these are now very different stakeholders.  Donors may place value on being 
able to demand accountability from the organizations for support rendered, but it is at the 
cost  of  credibility  of  the  institution  in  the  eyes  of  the  remaining  stakeholders.  
Furthermore, a heavy dependence on external funding, particularly from a single source, 
raises the organization‘s vulnerability to cutbacks by the donor.
39  And for a given bundle 
of donor  dollars, the success of one organization implies a loss to another (from ii). 
SOPAC‘s success, as an example, was seen as a cost to other regional organizations.  
 
Why do donors provide the bulk of funding to regional organizations?  This is a harder 
question to answer and one that deserves close scrutiny.  Some of the reasons include 
(i) to exert influence in decision-making at the operational level (Hughes, 2005); (ii) to 
                                                            
39  Pacific Islands Aids Foundation (PIAF), headquartered in Cook Islands, was facing serious funding 
challenges  due  to  the  decision  by  NZAID  to  terminate  its  support  on  the  expiry  of  their  6-year 
partnership agreement at the end of January 2010.   
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provide regional public goods, such as maritime security, that serve the national interest 
(Rudd, 2009); and (iii) to hasten progress on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
within  the  region.
40  These  reasons may  explain  why  donors  provide  the  majority  of 
funding  to  Pacific  Island  regional  organizations,  but  it  does  not  explain  the  large 
variability  in  funding  across  organizations  and  over  time  for  any  given  organization.  
Interviews  with  some  of  the  recipients  have  suggested  that  history  and  personal 
relationships, particularly the image of an organization‘s CEO, have significant influence.  
One senior regional bureaucrat claimed that their major sponsors trusted them and their 
systems,  and  thus  were  happy  to  channel  the  majority  of  their  funds  through  his 
organization.   
 
 
5.1  Accountability and Effectiveness 
 
The  processes  of  accountability  have  many  common  traits  across  all  regional 
organizations.  Governing bodies meet regularly, often annually but in a few cases bi-
annually.  Senior officials of regional organizations will meet more often and with a view 
to improved coordination and deeper integration of the services provided.  A few have 
activities  and  programs  in  place  to  engender  greater  cooperation  and  integration  of 
deliverables.   Most  of the larger regional  organizations provide information,  including 
financial  accounts,  on  their  website.    The  SPC  opens  its  meeting  of  the  governing 
council to the public.  All of the practices outlined above are geared towards improving 
accountability. 
 
Evidence on the effectiveness of individual organizations is more difficult to find.  This is 
due to inherent problems of measurement and the paucity of analysis.  The Australian 
and New Zealand aid agencies did, however, commission a study with the preliminary 
findings released last year.  This study, while yet to be released to the public, is critical of 
the  ―value-for-money‖  being  realized  by  several  regional  organizations  that  receive 
taxpayer funds from the two above-named nations.  New Zealand raised concerns over 
this issue during the 40
th PIF in Australia in 2009. 
 
The assessment of the effectiveness of the Pacific Plan, a soft institution for regionalism, 
is even less sanguine.  A consultant hired to assess the effectiveness of the Pacific Plan 
after 3 years of operation reported:  
In visits to member countries, in almost all of these visits, there was nearly always 
other delegations from one CROP agency or another doing work in the member 
countries: a workshop to assist farmers in looking after livestock, a workshop to 
develop  a  national  waste  management  strategy,  a  Ministerial  meeting  on 
information and communication technology, consultations with the private sector by 
Pacific Island Private Sector Organisation (PIPSO), a regional delegation working 
with members in the development of a Joint Country Strategy, a fisheries related 
meeting,  a  workshop  on  freedom  of  information,  a  team  to  assist  with  the 
                                                            
40  See  AusAID‘s  focus  on  the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  at  http://www.ausaid.gov. 
au/keyaid/mdg.cfm.   
Shaping New Regionalism in the Pacific Islands: Back to the Future?  |       21 
 
 
development of a national public health strategy, an environment related meeting, 
a team working on the development of an implementation strategy for the national 
population policy, a regional civil servant assisting in the development of library 
services,  assistance  with  the  development  of  a  private  sector  development 
strategy, etc. Yet in some of the consultation meetings with ‗official contacts‘ and 
principal policy makers in these countries visited, there is usually no appreciation 
of  these  useful  activities  taking  place  on  the  ground  as  we  met,  with  no  clear 
indication  of  how  the  country  has  benefited  from  the  various  regional 
organizations.
41  
   
Capacity building has been repeatedly cited as an objective in many regional initiatives.  
A constant criticism of regional organizations, however, has been that they draw away 
the best talent from member nations.  This problem is exacerbated by demands from the 
member states that senior management positions are filled by Pacific Islanders.  The 
mandatory  country  rotation  of  senior  positions  across  an  organization‘s  membership, 
with  some  of  the  countries  having  a  very  small  pool  of  skilled  personnel,  makes 
recruitment  of  appropriate  talent  extremely  difficult.    And  the  large  differences  in 
emoluments between national and international bureaucracies ensure that migration is 
from the former to the latter.  
 
Demands for better services from the regional organizations are subdued as a result of 
the  subsidized  subscription  for the  majority  of  the  members.    Political  appointments, 
when made, compound this problem further.  Membership is cheap for Pacific Island 
countries,  thus  they  have  had  little  need  to  scrutinize  the  value  they  get  from  their 
multiple memberships in regional institutions.  A way around this problem would be to 
introduce a user-fee system, in which membership contributions are mandated to meet 
the majority share of the operational budget.  Donors could provide the funds to the 
members on a bilateral basis, which then may be channeled to the regional organization.  
Such circumvention, particularly if channeled via the national budget, is likely to raise 
debate in-country on the value of membership in regional organizations.  It would also 
reduce the influence, perceived or real, of donors in the operational decisions of regional 
organizations.  As to whether donors will be willing to take this option remains to be 
tested, however. 
 
5.2  Prospects for Regionalism 
 
On  current  trends,  regional  institutions  within  the  Pacific  Islands  will  undergo  closer 
scrutiny of their effectiveness.  Their future, however, is likely to be determined as much 
by national and regional politics as the need for their services and the value-for-money 
that these organizations generate.  Similarly, the soft institutions for regionalism, such as 
the Pacific Plan and multiple preferential trading agreements, will also be put under the 
microscope.  The future of regionalism within the Pacific Islands, however, is likely to be 
influenced  mostly  by  geography,  geopolitics,  and  economics.    Distance  from  major 
markets will continue to affect patterns of integration, as it did a century and half ago.  
Security concerns and strategic considerations will continue to attract major powers to 
                                                            
41   Baaro (2009). p.26.  
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the region, as they also did in the 19
th century. And endowments, particularly of large 
oceanic resources, will underscore commerce between the region and the rest of the 
world, as was the case pre-colonization.  On these counts, the regionalism of the future 
for the Pacific Islands can be seen as mirroring events going back 150 years.   
 
Modernity however has introduced two fresh concerns. First, the Pacific Ocean is neither 
borderless  nor  boundless  anymore,  and  the  resources  therein  are  finite.    Managing 
these sustainably demands a regional approach.  And the size of the Pacific Ocean itself 
makes it a global asset, particularly when its ecological value is imputed.  Second, the 
risks  to  Pacific  Islanders  of  the  potentially  adverse  effects  of  climate  change  loom 
large.
42  Mitigating these risks necessitates a global response.  And given their size, no 
individual  Pacific  Island  nation  is  likely  to  be  heard  in  the  global  forums  on  climate 
change, thus the case for a collective voice. Regional institutions are likely to assist with 
this.
43  These same challenges are faced by the Caribbean region, a model examined 
next, as the impact of climate change is of concern to island nations as a whole.  
 
5.3  Could Caribbean Single Market and Economy Serve as a Model? 
 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) could serve as an aspiration for Pacific Island 
regionalism.  But the Caribbean has a number of crucial differences  with  the Pacific 
Islands.  Three such differences that matter the most for regionalism are (i) its better 
developed institutions, including the absence of customary tenure to land, which is a 
product of the different timing of colonial contact in the Caribbean; (ii) membership in 
regional organizations that is more homogenous in terms of economic attributes (e.g., 
CARICOM would be similar to PIF if Canada and the USA were members); and, (iii) 
closer proximity to major markets.   
 
Nonetheless, the proposed transition from a  common market to a  single market and 
single economy provides guiding principles for the creation of a common market within 
the Pacific Islands.  Non-discrimination, as noted below, is a key principle.  On this, the 
CARICOM membership had the following to say:
44  
[CARICOM] resolve[s] to establish conditions which would facilitate access by their 
nationals to the collective resources of the Region on a non-discriminatory basis 
(Preamble   to     Revised  Treaty  of  Chaguaramas   establishing   the   Caribbean   
 
                                                            
42  Tuvalu  is  believed  to  become  uninhabitable  by  2050  (Island  States  Unite  on  Climate  Change. 
Fiji Live. 23 September 2009). 
 
43  Leaders of the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS) raised this as an issue at the Leaders‘ 
Summit at the UN in New York on 21 September 2009 and were expected to do the same at the 
December 2009 summit in Copenhagen (Island States Warn of Benign Genocide. www.abc.gov.au. 
23 September 2009). 
44  The 15 full members of CARICOM include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Dominica,  Grenada,  Guyana,  Haiti,  Jamaica,  Montserrat,  St.  Kitts  and  Nevis,  Saint  Lucia,  St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.  Haiti became a full member of 
CARICOM on 3 July 2002.  CARICOM has 5 associate members: Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands.   
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Community,  including  the  CARICOM  single  market  and  economy,  signed  at 
Chaguaramas on 4 July 1973). 
 
Other principles worthy of emulation include the following: 
(i)  The  formation  of  a  single  common  market  (Article  78),  including  a 
coordinated external trade policy (Article 80) and common external tariff 
(Article 82).   
(ii)  Use of common standards and accreditation (and/or mutual recognition) 
of qualifications (Article 33).  
(iii)  Free  movement  within  the  Community  of  nationals  classified  as  (a) 
university graduates, (b) media workers, (c) sportspersons, (d) artistes, 
and  (e)  musicians  (Articles  45  and  46).    Article  46  further  obliges 
members  to  establish  legislative  and  procedural  arrangements  to 
eliminate the need for passports and visas to allow nationals to work in 
the community and to allow for the transportability of pensions.   
In terms of trade integration, the Pacific Islands have a long way to go to catch up with 
the Caribbean, which may still serve as an aspiration, however.  A pragmatic approach 
for the Pacific Islands would be one of unilateral liberalization, which does not require 
institutions for regionalism.  Interviews conducted with several diplomats from the Pacific 
Islands revealed that the blockage to such a shift stemmed from an ingrained belief in 
mercantilism.  One diplomat argued that Pacific Island countries would have nothing to 
export if they did not provide domestic protection.  Another argued that there was not a 
level playing field in international trade and thus questioned why his small island nation 
should open up its markets.  The rebuttals to these arguments come easily to students 





6.  Conclusion 
 
This paper‘s narrative on regionalism began with a discussion on the creation of several 
small states within the Pacific Island region as a result of its colonial history, which was 
shaped by geography, particularly isolation from Europe. A shared ocean and colonial 
past  have  been  prominent  aspects  of  regionalism  in  the  Pacific  Islands,  as  has  the 
desire to exploit the benefits of economies of scale.  The last is particularly pertinent, 
given the small size of many of the nations in this region.   
 
Security, however, has always lurked in the background as another important reason for 
regionalism.  The British colonies in Australia and New Zealand feared encroachment by 
                                                            
45  The discussant to an earlier draft of this paper, an economics professor from the University of the 
South  Pacific,  echoed  these  very  same  sentiments.    He  went  on  to  argue  that  Australia  and 
New Zealand must pay island governments to compensate them for the adoption of liberal trade 
policies.  
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unfriendly  powers  prior  to  colonization  of  the  islands,  and  thus  pressed  for  the 
annexation of neighboring Pacific Islands by London. The security concerns of Australia 
and  New  Zealand,  while  present  since  pre-colonization,  have  taken  on  greater 
prominence  within  the 21
st  century  regionalism  of the  Pacific  Islands.   Security  as  a 
concept  has  changed  over  time:  pre-colonization  and  during  colonization,  it  was 
predominantly  about  mitigating  a  military  threat;  post-decolonization,  it  broadened  to 
include  human  security,  including  progress  towards  the espoused  MDGs.  In the  late 
19
th century, it was unfriendly Germany and France that were feared, and in the mid-
20
th century this unease shifted to Japan and the Soviet Union. The identity of the source 
of the threat has changed, as has the breadth of what is defined as security, but the 
security fears of Australia and New Zealand remain.  In sum, the cast of characters 
might change in the future (e.g., the PRC or India), but the (security) plot remains.   
 
Geography  has  left  the  Pacific  Islands  isolated,  but  not  immune,  from  the  shocks 
emanating  from  a  distant  metropolis.    The  US  Civil  War  sent  the  UK  searching  for 
alternative  supplies  of  cotton,  which  is  one  of  the  reasons  why  the  Fiji  Islands  was 
annexed.  Territorial claims in Africa by the major powers in the mid-20
th century were 
resolved together with  the partitioning of territories  in the  Pacific Island  region.  The 
shockwaves from the terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington DC in 2001, and 
Bali a year later, are still shaping regionalism within the Pacific Islands.  The perennials 
of political instability, civil unrest, and developmental failures remain forces that continue 
to shape regionalism within the Pacific.
46  On these counts, the future of regionalism can 
be seen in the history of the Pacific Islands. 
 
A  number  of  agreements  are  in  place  to  induce  cooperation  with  respect  to  trade 
liberalization, regarding the pursuit of the development and security aspirations of the 
islanders, and to raise the collective profile of island issues in international forums.  On 
the first  issue, a number of preferential trading agreements are in place,  and a new 
agreement (PACER+) is being negotiated. It remains a puzzle why there is a need for 
such  agreements  given  that  free  trade  is  incentive-compatible  for  small  states.
47  
Mercantilist  biases  is  one,  albeit  unfortunate,  explanation.  The  political  economy  of 
protection, particularly the capacity to deregulate trade unilaterally in the face of strong 
domestic lobbies, could also be part of the explanation.  If so, then it still remains to be 
explained why domestic lobbies heed to constraints imposed from outside the nation.  In 
any case, the success of these agreements with respect to freeing up international trade 
remains to be determined.  Second, an ambitious Pacific Plan has been announced by 
PIF  to  strengthen  regional  cooperation  and  integration  as  a  means  to  raise  national 
income.  It  has  been  in  operation  less  than  4  years,  but  an  assessment  of  its 
effectiveness, even if premature, is less than sanguine. On the third, the Pacific Plan 
was  amended  in  2007  to  allow  for  member  nations  to  take  collective  positions  in 
international forums for advocating the special case of small island developing states, 
and for ―maintaining regional solidarity‖ among members in the management of tuna 
                                                            
46  See Duncan and Chand (2002), and Hawskley (2009). 
47  Tariffs comprised less than 2% of total government revenues and could be ―easily covered from 
other revenue sources.‖ (Duncan, 2008).  Their continued use, in any case, is an argument for 
protection and not one for formation of regional institutions for trade liberalization.  
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stocks and the promotion of ―national tuna industries.‖
48 It may be too early to judge their 
effectiveness given that these changes were instituted only very recently.  
 
The  economic case for  the  pooling  of  sovereignty, given  diseconomies  of scale  with 
respect to provision of security and environmental services – these being regional public 
goods – within the Pacific Islands, is strong.  Similarly, regionalism lends leaders of small 
Pacific Island nations a platform to project their concerns to the rest of the world; for 
example,  concerns  regarding  climate  change  and  its  impact  on  the  welfare  of  the 
islanders being a clear case in point.  Regional institutions, however, lack economic 
justification to achieve deeper trade integration.  Each of the above-mentioned raises 
costs  of  overcoming  problems  of  collective  action,  including  the  political  costs  of 
cooperation.  Crucially,  pooling  necessitates  some  degree  of  the  trading  off  of 
sovereignty.  This raises two challenges for regionalism: (i) striking a balance between 
the benefits from pooling with the cost in terms of lost sovereignty, and (ii) mitigating the 
incentives to renege on agreements when circumstances change. The case of the Fiji 
Islands  abiding  by  the collective  decision  at  the  2004  PIF  ―to the full  observance of 
democratic values and for its defence and promotion of human rights‖ following the last 
coup  d’etat  is  a  clear  case  in  point.    While  the  benefits  of  a  regional  approach  in 
providing public goods and projecting regional concerns within the global forum might 
justify their costs, those for trade integration might not.  Consequently, trade integration 
may  be  dropped  from  the  agenda  of  regionalism.    That  is,  individual  Pacific  Island 
nations may consider pursuing trade liberalization on a unilateral basis.
49  Such a goal 
can  be  achieved  via  lowering  the  costs  of  private  enterprise  within  the  domestic 
economy.  The metrics for the above are compiled by the World Bank‘s Cost of Doing 
Business Surveys, obviating the need for having this data generated locally or regionally.  
Furthermore,  the  state  will  continue  to  have  responsibility  for  investments  in  public 
infrastructure, basic education, and primary healthcare, which collectively would provide 
the conditions for growth of private enterprise (Growth Commission, 2008).   
 
Many  of  the  forces  that  have  shaped  regionalism  in  the  Pacific  Islands—geography, 
geopolitics, and security—remain unaffected by the passage of time.  These forces have 
not diminished in importance in the past century and a half.  Rather, security concerns 
have become more important.  Similarly, Australia and New Zealand, the largest and 
richest members of PIF, played a significant role in supporting and sustaining institutions 
for  regionalism  in  the  Pacific  Islands  in  the  past.    Their  role  in  future  regionalism 
initiatives  is  likely  to  remain  just  as  important.  What  has  changed,  however,  is  the 
emergence  of  fresh  issues  such  as  the  management  of  regional  commons  and  the 
impact of climate change. The combination of all of these factors will shape the future of 





                                                            
48   Va‘vau decision on the Pacific Plan reported in PIFS. 2007b. pp. 42–52.  
 
49  Duncan  (2008)  makes  a  similar  argument,  noting  that  unilateral  liberalization  would  save  the 
countries the large administrative costs of WTO membership.  
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Table 1: Basic Economic and Physical Indicators, and Country Classification 
 





















Australia  21,015  5.03E11  32,735  42  7,682,300  6,384,731  OECD 
Cook Islands
d  20    n.a  85
e   237
g   1,957,430  LMIE 
Fiji Islands  834  1.84E09  4,064  113  18,270  1,282,978  UMIE 
Kiribati  95  4.6E07  1,223  113
e   810  3,441,810  LMIE 
Marshall Islands  58  1.33E08  2,282
a   58
e   180  1,990,530  LMIE 
Federated States 
of Micronesia  111  2.05E08  2,646  62
e   700  2,996,419  LMIE 
Nauru
d  9    2,818
e .  114
e,f   21
g   308,480   
Niue  1    5,800
g   n.a  260
g   321,876   
New Caledonia  242      n.a  18,280  1,422,319   
New Zealand  4,228  6.42E10  25,281  n.a  267,710  3,468,998  OECD 
Northern  
Mariana Islands  84      n.a  460  758,121   
Palau  20  1.35E08  6,701
a  132  460  603,978   
Papua New 
Guinea  6,324  4.15E09  1,968  157  452,860  2,402,288  LIE 
Samoa  181  3.10E08  4,218  41  2,830  127,950  LMIE 
Solomon Islands  495  3.78E08  1,628  21
e   27,990  1,589,477  LIE 
Timor-Leste  1,061  3.19E08  677  49
e   14,870  70,326   
Tonga  102  1.70E08  3,539  91
e   720  659,558  LMIE 
Tuvalu
d  10    2,441
e   58
e,f   26
g   749,790   
Vanuatu  226  2.88E08  3,461  48
e   12,190  663,251  LMIE 
World  6.61E09  3.95E13  9,435    1.3E08     
 
EEZ = exclusive economic zone. 
 
Notes: GDP is in 2000 US$; GDP per capita is PPP at 2005 prices with the exception for Republic of Marshall Islands 
(RMI) and Palau where US$ at 2000 prices are used; 
a GDP per capita is in constant US dollars at 2000 prices because 
PPP figures are not reported; 
b EEZ data was accessed from Fisheries Centre at The University of British Columbia, 
accessed on 25 May 2009 at: http://www.seaaroundus.org/eez/eez.aspx; 
c country classification as provided by the World 
Bank – LIE denotes Low Income Economy, LMIE denotes lower-middle-income-economy, UMIE denotes upper-middle-
income-economy; 
d data accessed from ADB (2008); 
e data is on GNI per capita for 2006, the latest year available, in 
current US$ from ADB(2008), table 2.3 on page 140 and table 4.12 on page 198; 
f data is for 2003, the most recent 
available;  and, 
g  data  extracted  from  CIA  Factbook  at:  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/cw.html .  All Forum Island States are listed as ‗Small Island Developing States (SIDS)‘ by the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO). 
 
Data unless otherwise stated is for 2007.   
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Table 2: Supra-structure Organizations (Year Created) 
 

















American Samoa               
Australia               
Cook Islands               
Fiji Islands               
France               
French Polynesia   
  a         
Guam               
Kiribati               
Marshall Islands               
Federated States of 
Micronesia 
             
Nauru               
New Caledonia   
  a         
New Zealand               
Niue               
Northern Mariana 
Islands 
             
Palau               
Pitcairn Islands               
Papua New Guinea               
Samoa               
Solomon Islands               
Tokelau    
  a         
Tonga               
Tuvalu               
USA            
d   
Vanuatu               
Wallis & Futuna   
  a         
               
Total members  26  4  16  8  4  20  4 
 
CFA = Compact of Free Association, GFANZ = Governed in Free Association with New Zealand, MSG = Melanesian 
Spearhead Group, PICL = Pacific Island Conference of Leaders, PIF = Pacific Island Forum, PNA = Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement, SPC = Secretariat of the Pacific Community.  
 
Notes: 
a New Caledonia and French Polynesia have ‗Associate Membership‘ to PIF, Tokelau and Wallis & Futuna plus the 
ADB and Timor-Leste have ‗Observer‘ status to the PIF; 
b The United Kingdom withdrew its membership from the SPC in 
1996, then rejoined in 1998, and then withdrew again in 2006; 
c PICL includes head of government of 20 Pacific states; 
d 
governors of Guam and Hawaii are included in PICL.  Associate members of the PICL include heads of the following 
regional organisations: Forum Fisheries Agency; Pacific Island Forum Secretariat; Pacific Basin Development Council; 
South  Pacific  Island Applied  Geoscience  Commission;  Secretariat  of  the  Pacific  Community;  South  Pacific  Regional 
Environment Program; Tourism Council of the South Pacific; and University of the South Pacific. 
 
Source: Official website of the respective organisation, accessed in the last week of May 2009.   
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Table 3: Infra-structure Organizations (and Year Established) 
 
















American Samoa                 
Australia                 
Cook Islands                 
Fiji Islands                 
France                 
French Polynesia                 
Guam                 
Kiribati                 
Marshall Islands                 
Federated States of 
Micronesia                 
Nauru                 
New Caledonia                 
New Zealand                 
Niue                 
Northern Mariana 
Islands                 
Palau                 
Pitcairn Islands                 
Papua New Guinea                 
Samoa                 
Solomon Islands                 
Tokelau                 
Tonga                 
Tuvalu                 
USA                 
Vanuatu                 
Wallis & Futuna                 
                 
Total members  12  21  12  17  11  25  15  27
c 
 
FFA = Forum Fisheries Agency, PFTAC = Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre, PFL = Pacific Forum shipping 
Line, SOPAC = South Pacific Island Applied Geoscience Commission, SPBEA = South Pacific Board for Educational 
Assessment, SPREP = South Pacific Regional Environment Program, USP = University of the South Pacific, WCPFC = 
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission. 
 
Notes: 
a New Caledonia and French Polynesia have ‗Associate Membership‘ to PIF, Tokelau and Wallis & Futuna plus the 
ADB and Timor-Leste have ‗Observer‘ status to the PIF; 
b The United Kingdom withdrew its membership from the SPC in 
1996, then rejoined in 1998, and then withdrew again in 2006; 
c Members not listed above include Canada, European 
Community, Japan, Korea, Philippines, and  Taipei,China; while, cooperating non-members include Belize, Indonesia, 
Senegal, Mexico, and El Salvador.   
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Table 4: Pacific Regional Trade Agreements 
 

















Pacific Island Forum Country 
Cook Islands                 
Fiji Islands                 
Kiribati                 




               
Nauru                 
Niue                 
Palau                 
Papua New 
Guinea                 
Samoa                 
Solomon Islands                 
Tonga                 
Tuvalu                 
Vanuatu                 
OECD 
Australia                 
New Zealand                 
European 
Community                 
USA                 
TOTAL  16  16  14  15    4  4  8 
 
CER  =  Closer  Economic  Relations  (Australia–New  Zealand  FTA),  CFA  =  Compact  of  Free  Association,  MSG  = 
Melanesian  Spearhead  Group,  PACER  =  Pacific Agreement  on  Closer  Economic  Relations,  PICTA  =  Pacific  Island 




a Palau signed the CFA as of 1995; 
b The Fiji Islands signed MSG Agreement in 1998; 
c Samoa and Tonga had 
observer status to the WTO as of 27 May 2009.   
 








Table A1: Member Contributions to Pacific Island Forum Secretariat, 2006-07 
 
Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 
Notes to and Forming Part of the Financial Statements 
For the Year Ended 31 December 2007 
 
Contributions from Member Countries – General Fund  2007 $  2006 $ 
Australia  1,302,809  1,302,809 
Cook Islands  35,403  35,403 
Federated States of Micronesia  69,536  69,536 
Fiji Islands  78,519  78,519 
French Polynesia  15,500  - 
Kiribati  35,403  35,403 
Nauru  35,403  35,403 
New Caledonia (Associate)  15,500  - 
New Zealand  1,302,809  1,302,809 
Niue  35,403  35,403 
Papua New Guinea  192,341  192,341 
Palau  35,403  35,403 
Republic of Marshall Islands  35,403  35,403 
Samoa  69,536  69,536 
Solomon Islands  69.536  69,536 
Tonga  69,536  69,536 
Tuvalu  35,403  35,403 
Vanuatu  69,536  69,534 
  3,502,979  3,471,977 
 
Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 
Notes to and Forming Part of the Financial Statements 
For the Year Ended 31 December 2007 
 
Contributions Income  2007 $  2006 $ 
Australia  4,798,770  7,004,453 
New Zealand  3,139,088  3,288,287 
Japan  287,485  335,458 
EU  6,679,963  2,656,992 
United States of America  1,867,995  - 
UNDP/ESCAP  244,672  338,592 
Great Britain  10,000  4,000 
Taipei,China  873,365  973,804 
Commonwealth Secretariat  551,969  1,093,130 
Korea  163,239  - 
People‘s Republic of China  1,682,277  436,455 
World Trade Organization  174,215  184,721 
Others  511,982  520,107 
Transfer from General Fund  658,318   
  21,643,338  16,835,999 
 
             Source: http://www.forumsec.org/resources/uploads/embeds/file/pifs_audited_report_2007.pdf  




Table A2: Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA): Status Report 
 
 
Done at Nauru  :  18 August 2001 
 
Entered into Force  :  13 April 2003 
 
Status:  :  12 December 2008 
 
Depositary:  :  Secretary General of the Pacific Islands  
    Forum Secretariat 
 





Party  Signed    Ratified/ Acceded    In Force 
Cook Islands  18 August  2001    28 August  2001    13 April  2003 
Federated States of     
Micronesia  5 April  2006             
Fiji Islands  18 August  2001    16 October  2001    13 April  2003 
Kiribati  18 August  2001    4 June  2003    4 July  2003 
Nauru  18 August  2001    14 March  2003    13 April  2003 
Niue  18 August  2001    26 February  2003    13 April  2003 
Palau  -               
Papua New Guinea  5 March  2002    5 August  2003    4 September  2003 
Marshall Islands  -               
Samoa  18 August  2001    10 October  2001    13 April  2003 
Solomon Islands  6 August  2002    2 June  2003    2 July  2003 
Tonga  18 August  2001    27 December  2001    13 April  2003 
Tuvalu  18 August  2001    16 April  2008    16 May  2008 
Vanuatu                       18 August  2001    21 June  2005    21 July  2005 
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Done at Nauru  :  18 August 2001 
 
Entered into Force :  3 October 2002 
 
Status:  :  12 December 2008 
 
Depositary:  :  Secretary General of the Pacific Islands 
                                          Forum Secretariat 
 





Party  Signed    Ratified    In Force 
Australia  18 August  2001    3 July  2002    3 October  2002 
Cook Islands  18 August  2001    28 August  2001    3 October  2002 
Federated States of 
Micronesia  -               
Fiji Islands  18 August  2001    16 October  2001    3 October  2002 
Kiribati  18 August  2001    4 June  2003    4 July  2003 
Nauru  18 August  2001    14 March  2003    13 April  2003 
New Zealand  18 August  2001    21 November  2001    3 October  2002 
Niue  18 August  2001    3 September  2002    3 October  2002 
Palau  18 August  2001             
Papua New Guinea  5 March  2002    5 August  2003    4 September  2003 
Marshall Islands  18 August  2001             
Samoa  18 August  2001    10 October  2001    3 October  2002 
Solomon Islands  6 August  2002    2 June  2003    2 July  2003 
Tonga  18 August  2001    27 December  2001    3 October  2002 
Tuvalu  18 August  2001             
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Table A4: Acronyms 
 
ADB      Asian Development Bank 
CARICOM  Caribbean Community and Common Market 
CER    Closer Economic Relations (Australia-NZ FTA) 
CFA    Compact of Free Association 
CROP    Council of Regional Organisations in the Pacific 
EEZ    Exclusive Economic Zone 
FFA    Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency  
FSM    the Federated States of Micronesia 
GFANZ    Governed in Free Association with New Zealand 
MSG    Melanesian Spearhead Group 
PACER    Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic Relations 
PASO    Pacific Aviation Safety Office 
PC    Pacific Community (c.f. SPC) 
PICL    Pacific Island Conference of Leaders 
PICTA    Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement 
PIDP    Pacific Island Development Program 
PIF    Pacific Island Forum (c.f. PIFS) 
PFTAC    Pacific Financial Technical Assistance Centre 
PIFS    Pacific Island Forum Secretariat 
PIPA    Pacific Island Producers Association 
PIPSO    Pacific Island Private Sector Organisation 
PNA    Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
RMI    the Republic of Marshall Islands 
PRIF    Pacific Regional Infrastructure Facility  
SOPAC    South Pacific Island Applied Geoscience Commission 
SPARTECA  South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
SPBEA    South Pacific Board for Educational Assessment 
SPC    Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
SPIF    South Pacific Island Forum (c.f. PIF) 
SPREP    South Pacific Regional Environment Program 
USP    University of the South Pacific 
WCPFC   Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
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